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Abstract
Artemov’s logic of proofs LP is a complete calculus of propositions and proofs, which is now becoming a foundation for the
evidence-based approach to reasoning about knowledge.Additional atoms in LP have form t :F , read as “t is a proof of F” (or, more
generally, as “t is an evidence for F”) for an appropriate system of terms t called proof polynomials. In this paper, we answer two
well-known questions in this area. One of the main features of LP is its ability to realize modalities in any S4-derivation by proof
polynomials thus revealing a statement about explicit evidences encoded in that derivation. We show that the original Artemov’s
algorithm of building such realizations can produce proof polynomials of exponential length in the size of the initial S4-derivation.
We modify the realization algorithm to produce proof polynomials of at most quadratic length. We also found a modal formula,
any realization of which necessarily requires self-referential constants of type c:A(c). This demonstrates that the evidence-based
reasoning encoded by the modal logic S4 is inherently self-referential.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The logic of proofs LP was introduced byArtemov as an explicit counterpart of Gödel’s logic of provability S4. The
main idea of LP was to replace atoms F , read as “F is provable,” by atoms t :F , understood as “t is a proof of F,”
with t being a proof object. The logic of proofs LP is supplied with an arithmetical semantics and enjoys completeness
with respect to it [2]. LP is proved to be decidable [9]. A complete overview can be found in [4]. Recent papers [5,8,3]
show that LP could serve as a basis for evidence-based reasoning.
The logic of proofs provided a long sought provability semantics for S4 via interpretation in Peano arithmetic. This
semantics appeared as a result of the realization procedure described in [1,2], which allows to realize an arbitrary cut-
free S4-derivation by a corresponding LP-derivation. In this paper, we analyze and optimize this realization procedure
and also show that S4-reasoning is inherently self-referential. The main results described in this paper are as follows:
(1) It is possible to perform realization with at most a polynomial overhead for the modiﬁed version of the procedure
(Brezhnev, Kuznets, Section 4).
(2) There are theorems of S4 such that any of their realizations requires self-referential constants (Kuznets, Section 5).
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Section 2 provides basic knowledge of the logics we use, and Section 3 gives a full-length discussion of the realization
procedure and modiﬁcations necessary to make its complexity polynomial.
2. Main deﬁnitions and facts
Our main goal is to analyze the procedure that realizes modalities in S4-derivations by proof terms of the logic of
proofs LP and to optimize this procedure in terms of complexity. To help the reader follow the details of the realization,
we give here a complete list of axioms and rules of both theories.
Here is the Hilbert-style formulation of the logic of proofs we use (see [2]):
Deﬁnition 1. The language of the logic of proofs LP contains
• the language of classical propositional logic which includes propositional variables, truth constants  and ⊥, and
boolean connectives
• proof variables x0, . . . , xn, . . ., proof constants c0, . . . , cn, . . .
• functional symbols: monadic !, binary · and +
• operator symbol of type “term: formula”
The logic of proofs LP has the following axioms:
A0 Finite set of axiom schemes of classical propositional logic 2
A1 t :F → F , “reﬂection”
A2 t :(F → G) → (s:F → (t · s):G), “application”
A3 t :F →!t :(t :F), “proof checker”
A4 s:F → (s + t):F , t :F → (s + t):F , “sum”
Inference rules are
R1 (F → G), F G, “modus ponens”
R2  c:A, if A is an axiom A0–A4 and c is a proof constant, “axiom necessitation”.
Proof terms built from proof variables and proof constants by means of functional symbols !, ·, and + are called
proof polynomials.
We will need the following well-known facts about LP (see [1, Lemma 2.17], [2, Lemma 5.4]).
Lemma 2 (Lifting lemma). Let x1:B1, . . . , xn:Bn F , then there exists a term t = t (x1, . . . , xn) such that x1:B1, . . . ,
xn:Bn  t :F .
Proof. Let  be an LP-derivation of F from hypotheses x1:B1, . . . , xn:Bn. By induction on the length of , we con-
struct a term t and a new derivation lift of t :F from the same hypotheses in the following way: we replace each
formula G in  by a sequence of formulas that ends with s:G for some term s. A formula G in  can be obtained in
four ways:
(1) G = A, where A is an axiom of LP. Then in lift we replace G by an instance c:A of the axiom necessitation rule
for a fresh proof constant c.
(2) G = xi :Bi is one of the hypotheses. Then in lift we replace G by the following three formulas:
xi :Bi, xi :Bi →!xi :xi :Bi, !xi :xi :Bi.
The last formula is the desired lifted version of G.
(3) G is obtained by modus ponens from E → G and E. By induction hypothesis, lift contains s1:(E → G) and s2:E
for some proof polynomials s1 and s2. We append lift by the following three formulas:
s1:(E → G) → (s2:E → s1 · s2:G), s2:E → s1 · s2:G, s1 · s2:G.
The last formula is the desired lifted version of G.
2 To be absolutely precise, we use the propositional part of system Hc from [10].
V. Brezhnev, R. Kuznets / Theoretical Computer Science 357 (2006) 23–34 25
(4) G = a:A is obtained by axiom necessitation, where A is an axiom and a is a proof constant. We replace G by the
following three formulas:
a:A, a:A →!a:a:A, !a:a:A.
Again, the last formula is the desired lifted version of G. 
Note 1: IfF is a theorem, it should be clear from the proof that term t is ground (does not contain variables). Moreover,
in that case, t is built from constants and proof-checked constants by means of application only.
Lemma 3. For any proof variables xi and any formulas Bi there exists a proof term s = s(x1, . . . , xn) such that
LP  x1:B1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Bn → s:(x1:B1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Bn).
Proof. Obviously, x1:B1, . . . , xn:Bn  x1:B1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Bn. Then by the Lifting Lemma we have just proved, there
exists a term s = s(x1, . . . , xn) such that x1:B1, . . . , xn:Bn  s:(x1:B1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Bn). Finally, simple propositional
reasoning involving the Deduction Theorem 3 provides the statement of the lemma. 
Now we describe the Gentzen-style version of S4 we use. We take system G3s from [10] and restrict it to the single
modal operator  (also cf. note at the end of [10, Deﬁnition 9.1.3]). 4 A similar system can be found in [7, *142.1]
under the name of S4∗. In that system, an antecedent and a consequent are considered to be lists of formulas whereas
in the system we use they are multisets of formulas. Since cut elimination is known to hold for this sequent calculus
(see [10]), we initially formulate it without the cut rule. Another advantage of this system is that it has no structural
rules; however, we have to allow some “weakening” in the (⇒ )-rule.
Deﬁnition 4. The Gentzen-style formulation of the modal logic S4 has the following axioms:
(1) S, ⇒ , S, where S is a propositional variable;
(2) ⊥, ⇒ .
Rules are
 ⇒ , A
(¬ ⇒)¬A, ⇒ 
A, ⇒ 
(⇒ ¬)
 ⇒ ,¬A
A,B, ⇒ 
(∧ ⇒)
A ∧ B, ⇒ 
 ⇒ , A  ⇒ , B
(⇒ ∧)
 ⇒ , A ∧ B
A, ⇒  B, ⇒ 
(∨ ⇒)
A ∨ B, ⇒ 
 ⇒ , A, B
(⇒ ∨)
 ⇒ , A ∨ B
 ⇒ , A B, ⇒ 
(→⇒)
A → B, ⇒ 
A, ⇒ , B
(⇒→)
 ⇒ , A → B
A,A, ⇒ 
( ⇒)
A, ⇒ 
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B
(⇒ ).
A1, . . . ,An, ⇒ ,B
Deﬁnition 5. To realize a modal formula F in the logic of proofs means to substitute proof polynomials for all
occurrences of  in F in such a way that the result yields an LP-formula F r .
Our goal is to realize all S4-theorems by some LP-theorems thereby explicating the provability operator by speciﬁc
proofs. Moreover, the scope of available realizations can be limited to the so-called normal realizations [1,2].
3 LP is proved to enjoy the Deduction Theorem, see [2].
4 In our system, 	 is considered to be an abbreviation of ¬¬.
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Deﬁnition 6. A realization r is called normal if all negative occurrences of modality are realized by proof variables.
Such a limitation arises from the fact that negative ’s constitute arguments of Skolem functions that emerge from
existential quantiﬁers. These quantiﬁers are hidden in subformulas F , understood as “there exists a proof of F.”
Thus, it is reasonable to demand that those Skolem arguments are realized by proof variables rather than by more
complicated proof polynomials. In [1,2], Artemov proved the following:
Theorem 7 (Realization theorem). If S4 F , then LP F r for some normal realization r.
In [1] and [2],Artemov describes slightly different variants of the realization procedure for constructing a realization
r and an LP-derivation of the realized formula F r from a given S4-derivation of F. The variants differ in that the
procedure from [2] produces Gentzen-style LP-derivations whereas the procedure from [1] produces Hilbert-style
derivations. The realization procedure given in this paper is based on the latter.
Kuznets showed that both variants of Artemov’s procedure give an exponential blow-up of the derivation size and
Brezhnev suggested a modiﬁcation to the procedure from [1] that produces at most a polynomial overhead. In the next
section, we provide all the necessary details of that modiﬁcation.
3. Realization procedure
First, we divide all occurrences ofmodality in the given derivation tree of⇒ F into families of related occurrences.
Namely, in a rule
 ⇒  [′ ⇒ ′]
′′ ⇒ ′′
,
each occurrence of in a side formula A in the premise of the rule is related only to the corresponding occurrence of
inA in the conclusion of the rule. Similarly, each occurrence of in an active formula of the rule, i.e. in a formula in the
premise that is transformed by the rule, is related only to the corresponding occurrence of in the principal formula of
the rule, i.e. in the result of that transformation. As an important example, consider the ( ⇒)-rule, in which formulas
A and A in the premise sequent are the active formulas and formula A in the conclusion sequent is the principal
formula. Note that corresponding occurrences of  inside A in formulas A and A are related here. A family of ’s is
simply an equivalence class with respect to the reﬂexive transitive closure of this relation.
Note that all the rules in the cut-free Gentzen system respect the polarity of formulas. Therefore, each family consists
of ’s of the same polarity. We will call a family positive (negative) if it consists of positive (negative) ’s.
Since different ’s from the same family correspond to the same occurrence of  in the derived sequence, we have
to realize all of them by the same proof polynomial that explicates that . Moreover, all ’s from a negative family
have to be realized by the same proof variable, due to the normality condition.
By induction on the depth of the derivation tree, we will simultaneously construct a realization and a Hilbert-style
proof of the realized formula. We will also keep track of the constant speciﬁcation used in that Hilbert-style proof, i.e.
of all the instances of the axiom necessitation rule R2 used in it. The procedure described combines two ideas, namely
the original method of translation proposed by Artemov in [1] and the methods used by Cook and Reckhow in [6].
Preliminary observations: There are only three ways of introducing new ’s in our system, namely
(1) inside a side formula in an axiom,
(2) inside a formula by which a sequent is “weakened” in a (⇒ )-rule, or
(3) the outer  in the principal formula of a (⇒ )-rule.
A given derivation tree of ⇒ F imposes a tree structure on each family of ’s whereby leaves of the family’s tree are
those nodes where’s of this family are ﬁrst introduced (either at a leaf of the derivation tree or in some (⇒ )-rule).
We will call a positive family of’s essential, if at least one of its leaves corresponds to a principal in a (⇒ )-rule,
and non-essential otherwise.
Let us enumerate all (⇒ )-rules in the tree and associate provisional variable ui with the ith rule, more precisely
with the principal  of that rule (in the course of the realization procedure, all these provisional variables will be
replaced by proof polynomials).
V. Brezhnev, R. Kuznets / Theoretical Computer Science 357 (2006) 23–34 27
First step: We choose distinct proof variables for each negative or non-essential positive family of’s. All’s from
such a family will be realized by a proof variable corresponding to that family.
Second step: In an essential positive family of ’s, with i1 < i2 < · · · < ik being all the numbers of (⇒ )-rules
that introduce’s from this family as the principle ones (case 3), all such’s are initially realized by provisional term
ui1 + ui2 + · · · + uik
(pluses are associated to the left). We also initialize a substitution  that acts on those provisional variables to be the
empty substitution. By the end of the realization procedure, this substitution  will assign a certain proof polynomial
to each provisional variable so that essential positive ’s will also be realized by proof polynomials that contain no
provisional variables.
Now each modal formula A occurring in the sequent derivation is translated into an LP-formula Ar as follows: each
occurrence of  in A is replaced by a proof polynomial t that possibly contains provisional variables. Here t is the
term realizing the family of that , whereas  is the current state of the substitution acting on provisional variables.
This substitution is appended during the realization procedure, namely, during processing of (⇒ )-rules.
Third step: By induction on the depth of the derivation tree of ⇒ F , for each sequent in the initial derivation, we
will construct
• an LP-formula C that corresponds to that sequent;
• a proof polynomial t that contains no provisional variables;
• a Hilbert-style derivation of t :C.
The external polynomials t may seem superﬂuous, but they prove to be a vital part of eliminating the exponential
blow-up. In the procedure, they are used while processing the (⇒ )-rules of the initial S4-derivation.
A formula C is constructed in a natural way: namely, a sequent
A1, A2, . . . , An ⇒ B1, B2, . . . , Bm
is translated into a formula
(. . . (Ar1 ∧ Ar2) ∧ . . .) ∧ Arn → (. . . (Br1 ∨ Br2) ∨ · · ·) ∨ Brm.5
Both the antecedent and the consequent of a sequent are multisets, so the order of formulas is irrelevant in them. But
normal Hilbert-style operations do not provide for such freedom. Therefore, we have to force some order on Ari ’s
and on Brj ’s. Any order that allows for efﬁcient sorting can be used, but this order should be uniform for all sequents.
Otherwise, we will not be able to use Cook and Reckhow’s idea of implementing each step of a Gentzen-style derivation
by several steps of the corresponding Hilbert-style proof because the formulas on different branches of the tree simply
would not match. For our purposes, let us choose the alphabetical order. An empty consequent constitutes an empty
disjunction and is, therefore, translated as ⊥; an empty antecedent (empty conjunction) is translated as . In particular,
⇒ F is translated as  → F r .
For example, the two types of axioms of the S4 sequent calculus (see Deﬁnition 4) for  = {A1, . . . , An},  =
{B1, . . . , Bm} are translated as
(1) Ar1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ari−1 ∧ S ∧ Ari ∧ · · · ∧ Arn → Br1 ∨ · · · ∨ Brj−1 ∨ S ∨ Brj ∨ · · · ∨ Brm
(2) ⊥ ∧ Ar1 ∧ · · · ∧ Arn → Br1 ∨ · · · ∨ Brm
(here we assume that Ark’s and Brl ’s are already ordered alphabetically, Sr = S becomes ith among Ark’s and jth among
Brl ’s upon insertion, and ⊥ is the ﬁrst symbol of the alphabet).
Each implication C of this type (a translation of a Gentzen-style axiom into the Hilbert-style language) is clearly
derivable in LP. Applying the Lifting Lemma to this derivation, we obtain a ground proof polynomial s and a derivation
of s:C. This concludes the base of our induction.
Consider any propositional rule with one premise
 ⇒ 
(R).
′ ⇒ ′
5For the rest of the paper, we will omit these parentheses; the convention will be that conjunctions and disjunctions are always associated to the
left.
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Let C and C′ be translations of  ⇒  and ′ ⇒ ′, respectively. By induction hypothesis, we have a term tC and a
derivation C of tC :C. By purely propositional reasoning, there is a derivation of C → C′. Using the Lifting Lemma
again, we get a ground term tR and a derivation R of tR:(C → C′). Concatenating C with R and appending the result
with the following sequence
tR:(C → C′) → (tC :C → tR · tC :C′), tC :C → tR · tC :C′, tR · tC :C′,
we obtain the term tC′ = tR · tC and the derivation C′ of tR · tC :C′.
A case of a propositional rule with two premises is handled in a similar way.
Let us discuss modal rules in more detail. Consider a ( ⇒)-rule
A,A,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm
( ⇒)
A,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm
.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the translation of the premise is
C = Br1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bri−1 ∧ Ar ∧ Bri ∧ · · · ∧ Brj−1 ∧ x:Ar ∧ Brj ∧ · · · ∧ Brn → D,
where D = Dr1 ∨ · · · ∨Drm and x is the proof variable associated with the negative family of the outer modality inA.
Then the translation of the conclusion is
C′ = Br1 ∧ · · · ∧ Brj−1 ∧ x:Ar ∧ Brj ∧ · · · ∧ Brn → D.
Since LP  x:Ar → Ar , it is easy to derive C → C′. Using the Lifting Lemma, we obtain a ground term t(⇒) and a
derivation (⇒) of t(⇒):(C → C′). The rest is the same as with the one-premise propositional rules.
The only rule that is treated differently is (⇒ ):
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B
(⇒ ).
D1, . . . , Dk,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,E1, . . . , Em
All main ’s in Ai’s are negative and belong to different families, so they are realized by distinct proof variables
xi’s. Let k be the number of this (⇒ )-rule and let its family be realized by us1 + · · · + uk + · · · + usl . By induction
hypothesis, we have a term tC and a derivation C of
tC :(x1:A
r
1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Arn → Br).
By Lemma 3, we construct a term s = s(x1, . . . , xn) and a derivation 1 of
x1:A
r
1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Arn → s:(x1:Ar1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Arn).
Note that s does not contain any provisional variables. Now, it is easy to append C together with 1 by the sequence
tC :(x: Ar → Br) → (s:(x: Ar) → tC · s:Br), s:(x: Ar) → tC · s:Br
(we abbreviate the conjunction using a vector notation). Further, using the syllogism rule, we get a derivation of
x1:A
r
1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Arn → tC · s:Br.
Using the axiom A4 several times leads to a derivation of
x1:A
r
1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn:Arn → (us1+ · · · + tC · s + · · · + usl):Br.
Moreover, this derivation is easy to append to get a derivation 2 of formula C′ that (modulo permutations) looks like
D ∧ x: Ar → (us1+ · · · + tC · s + · · · + usl):Br ∨ E
(here D and x: Ar stand for conjunctions, E is a disjunction). As usual, now we use the Lifting Lemma to produce a
ground term tC′ and a derivation C′ of
tC′ :( D ∧ x: Ar → (us1+ · · · + tC · s + · · · + usl):Br ∨ E).
Here lies the main improvement over the original procedure from [1]. This modiﬁcation is what makes the whole
procedure polynomial in the size of the initial S4-derivation: while lifting 2, there is no need to lift its initial part C
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since the only formula we use in the second part is tC :(x: Ar → Br). But this formula is easily lifted by adding to C
the following two formulas
tC :(x: Ar → Br) →!tC :tC :(x: Ar → Br) and !tC :tC :(x: Ar → Br),
the latter being the desired lifted version. This modiﬁed procedure also produces a ground term because tC is ground.
In the original algorithm from [1], every time a (⇒ )-rule is processed, the number of formulas in the Hilbert-style
derivation is multiplied by a constant factor since most formulas in the initial derivation are replaced by three formulas
in the lifted one. Thus, the size of the Hilbert-style derivation grows exponentially in the number of (⇒ )-rules, as
opposed to the polynomial growth in the modiﬁed version. To illustrate this difference consider
Example 8.
S ⇒ S
⇒ S → S
⇒ (S → S)
⇒ (S → S)
Omitting several irrelevant technicalities, our procedure ﬁrst produces a ground external term t, a term t1, and a proof
of formula t :t1:(S → S), that corresponds to the third sequent. Processing the fourth sequent calls for a new external
term t ′ and a term t2, such that LP  t ′:t2:t1:(S → S). It is immediate that t2 may be taken to be the previous external
term t. This is done by the original procedure and the modiﬁed one as well. The way they construct term t ′ is drastically
different. The original procedure suggested lifting the whole derivation of t :t1:(S → S), making the derivation about
three times longer. In the modiﬁed procedure, we note that t ′ can be taken to be !t so that the length of the derivation
stays almost the same.
Now, we append  by a new substitution:  =  + {uk ← tC · s}, and apply this substitution throughout the
derivation. 6 After that, there are no occurrences of uk left in our derivation. As a result, we got rid of one provisional
variable.
Final touch:At the end of the procedure, the whole derivation tree of ⇒ F is translated. By that time, all (⇒ )-rules
have been processed and there are no provisional variables left. Thus, F r is simply an LP-formula; moreover, we have
a Hilbert-style derivation of t :( → F r) for some ground term t. The following four formulas append that derivation
to get the desired realization F r :
t :( → F r) → ( → F r),  → F r, , F r .
4. Complexity of the realization procedure
In this section, we evaluate the complexity of the realization procedure from Section 3. We show that the procedure
gives at most a polynomial overhead with respect to the size of the initial S4-derivation.
First, we state several lemmas instrumental in evaluating the complexity of the realization procedure.
Lemma 9. The size of a full Hilbert-style derivation corresponding to an instance of the syllogism rule used on formulas
A, B, and C of lengths a, b, and c respectively, i.e.
A → B B → C
(Syl)
A → C
,
is a linear function in a, b, and c.
It is not generally true that the size of the derivation grows linearly under the use of deduction or lifting.
6 LP is known to be closed under substitutions, see [2].
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Remark 10. It is well known, that each deduction expands the size (number of formulas) in a proof by a constant factor,
thus making the size exponential in the number of deductions. Thorough observation of the proof of the Lifting Lemma
shows the same tendency. Moreover, the size of the term constructed in the proof is the size of the original derivation
(modulo a multiplicative constant). Therefore, just the size of terms constructed by the consecutive applications of the
Lifting Lemma is already exponential in the number of applications.
However, the following lemmas may be proved via a thorough analysis of both procedures.
Deﬁnition 11. A set H of Hilbert-style derivations is called an [f (n), g(n)]-set if each derivation in H that consists
of O(f (n)) formulas has size of O(g(n)).
Lemma 12. LetH be an [f (n), g(n)]-set of derivations i ofi , Ai Bi such that size of formulas in each derivation of
O(f (n)) formulas does not exceedO(h(n)). (FormulaAi is considered to be present in i .) Then setHded of derivations
dedi of i Ai → Bi obtained from i’s via the deduction procedure is an [f (n), g(n) + f (n)h(n)]-set.
The two most common instances of this lemma used in our evaluation are
Corollary 13. (1) If H is an [n, n2]-set such that each derivation of O(n) formulas consists of formulas of size O(n),
then Hded is an [n, n2]-set.
(2) If H is an [n2, n3]-set such that derivation of O(n2) formulas consists of formulas of size O(n), then Hded is an
[n2, n3]-set.
Lemma 14. Let H be an [f (n), g(n)]-set of derivations i of (x)i :( A)i Bi such that each formula in i serves
as a premise to O(1) modus ponens rules and size of formulas in each derivation of O(f (n)) formulas does not
exceed O(h(n)). Then set Hlift of derivations lifti of (x)i :( A)i  ti :Bi obtained from i’s via the lifting procedure is an[f (n), g(n) + (f (n) + h(n))h(n)]-set such that size of ti for derivation i of O(f (n)) formulas is O(f (n)).
The restriction that each formula is used only a limited number of times as a premise to a modus ponens rule is
necessary because the size of ti is linear in the number of steps in the initial Hilbert-style derivation represented as a
tree. Normally, we are allowed to reuse formulas, so our derivations are more of a DAG than a tree. Nevertheless, this
restriction is not too binding. All the derivations used in the realization procedure trivially satisfy it. Let us call such
derivations good.
Corollary 15. (1) If H is an [n, n2]-set such that each derivation of O(n) formulas is good and consists of formulas
of size O(n), then Hlift is an [n, n2]-set. The size of the constructed terms is O(n) for a derivation of O(n) formulas.
(2) If H is an [n2, n3]-set such that each derivation of O(n2) formulas is good and consists of formulas of size O(n),
then Hlift is an [n2, n4]-set. The size of the constructed terms is O(n2) for a derivation of O(n2) formulas.
In [6], Cook andReckhow showed that a propositional Hilbert system is capable of simulating propositional Gentzen-
style proofs with at most a polynomial overhead. Their argument runs as follows: axioms of a Gentzen calculus are
translated into tautologies; each step of a Gentzen-style derivation is realized by a certain sequence of formulas in the
target Hilbert-style derivation.
In this paper, we use a similar procedure, but in addition we lift each sequence to construct an external term
corresponding to that sequence. It is essential for the complexity that we never work with the whole Hilbert-style
derivation, but only with the part that corresponds to the last Gentzen-style step: in particular, while lifting for the
(⇒ )-rule, we do not lift C (see Section 3).
Negative and non-essential positive ’s are realized by proof variables, i.e each “” is replaced by two symbols,
“proof variable” and “colon,” thereby stretching the proof at most twice. For the purposes of complexity evaluation, it
is convenient to postpone the actual evaluation of the size of terms (us1 + · · · + usl ) till the end of the procedure and
to consider them to be of the size 1. A thorough analysis of the realization procedure shows the following.
Consider a set G of all Gentzen-style steps other than (⇒ ); let n denote the size of a conclusion sequent for a
step. Then set H of corresponding Hilbert-style derivations that realize steps from G is an [n2, n4]-set modulo adding
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a constant number of formulas that involve external term tC to each derivation in H. The size of the external term
is increased by O(n2) per Gentzen step. Consider now a (⇒ )-step; let n denote the size of a conclusion sequent.
Realizing this step may involve as many as O(n)+O(f ) formulas, where f is the number of (⇒ )-rules in the whole
family of the introduced by the step.O(f ) formulas are used to derive tC ·s:Br  (us1+· · ·+tC ·s+· · ·+usf ):Br . The
size of the Hilbert-style sequence that realizes this step is also more intricate: it is O(n2)+O(nf )+O(f 2); additionally,
we need to use the previous external term tC no more than O(n+ f ) times. After the lifting the new external term will
contain only one occurrence of !tC since before the lifting the formula tC :C is used as a premise to a modus ponens
rule only once. Therefore, the size of the external term is increased by O(n + f ).
Bounding
∑
i fi by the size N of the initial Gentzen-style derivation and using inequality
∑
i n
k
i (
∑
i ni)
k = Nk ,
we conclude that the size of the realizing Hilbert-style proof is O(N4) if we consider any term realizing a  to be of
size 1. Further, all external terms have a size O(N2) and the number of formulas in the realizing proof is also O(N2).
It remains to note that substituting terms tC · s of a size O(N2) for each of O(N3) occurrences of the corresponding
provisional variable u for each of f provisional variables of the corresponding family gives at most an fO(N5) overhead
per family, and the sum over all the families may again be bounded by O(N6). We proved the following
Theorem 16. For a givenGentzen-style cut-free S4-derivation of⇒ F of size N, the procedure from Section 3 produces
a realization F r and its Hilbert-style LP-derivation  such that
(1)  contains O(N2) formulas;
(2) the size of  is O(N6);
(3) the sizes of external terms used in  are O(N2).
Note 2: One should not mistaken the complexity of realizing a given S4-proof into LP, which is polynomial in the
size of that proof, for the complexity of constructing such a proof from a given formula and its further realization. The
latter problem is most probably exponential in the size of the formula since S4 is known to be PSPACE-complete.
5. Self-referentiality of modal logic S4
In this section, we explore a fundamental question of whether proofs encoded by modal logic S4 are self-referential.
Our main result is that the realization of some S4-theorems necessarily calls for a constant speciﬁcation with self-
referential constants, i.e. for a CS that involves axiom necessitation instances of type c:A(c) for an axiom A(c) that
contains constant c.
Theorem 17. Let
CS = {c:A | Ais an axiom that does not contain occurrences of c},
the largest non-self-referential 7 constant speciﬁcation.Let S be apropositional variable.Then for any proof polynomials
t and t ′
LPCS¬t ′:¬(S → t :S).
Corollary 18. S4-theorem ¬¬(S → S) cannot be realized in LP without self-referential constants even if we drop
requirement of a normal realization.
Proof of Theorem 17. We prove the claim by presenting for any proof polynomials t and t ′ an M-model 8 of LPCS
where ¬t ′:¬(S → t :S) is false. Thus, by completeness, ¬t ′:¬(S → t :S) cannot be a theorem of LPCS .
We will brieﬂy review the deﬁnition of M-models. To describe an M-model M = (∗, v,) one has to deﬁne
(1) an evidence function ∗ that assigns a set ∗(s) of LP-formulas (not necessarily true) to each proof polynomial s. An
evidence function has to satisfy the following three conditions:
(a) if F ∈ ∗(s), then (s:F) ∈ ∗(!s)
7 To be absolutely precise, only one-step self-referentiality is ruled out.
8 M-models were called pre-models in [9].
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(b) if (F → G) ∈ ∗(s1) and F ∈ ∗(s2), then G ∈ ∗(s1 · s2)
(c) ∗(s1) ∪ ∗(s2) ⊆ ∗(s1 + s2)
(2) a truth assignment v that assigns a truth value to each propositional variable.
Truth relation  is deﬁned as follows:
(1) M S iff v(S) = true
(2) boolean connectives are classical
(3) M s:F iff F ∈ ∗(s) and MF .
An evidence function ∗ is called a CS-function if A ∈ ∗(c) for each axiom necessitation instance c:A ∈ CS. An
M-model M = (∗, v,  ) is called a CS-model if ∗ is a CS-function.
Mkrtychev in [9] proved that for any set X of conditions F ∈ ∗(s) on the evidence function there exists the smallest 9
evidence function satisfying all conditions from X. This smallest function is the termwise intersection of all functions
that satisfy conditions from X; on the other hand, each true statement G ∈ ∗(s′) about the smallest evidence function
may be derived from the conditions from X by using rules 1a–1c from the deﬁnition of an evidence function. In
particular, for any constant speciﬁcation CS there exists the smallest CS-function satisfying all conditions from X.
Till the end of this section by CS we will mean the largest non-self-referential constant speciﬁcation deﬁned in
Theorem 17. Consider any proof polynomials t and t ′ that might realize modalities in ¬¬(S → S). We now
construct a CS-model that refutes the would-be realization ¬t ′:¬(S → t :S). Let ∗ be the smallest CS-function that
satisﬁes condition (¬(S → t :S)) ∈ ∗(t ′). Let truth assignment v assign true to all propositional variables. Then
M = (∗, v,  ) is the desired countermodel.
For ¬t ′:¬(S → t :S) to be false, t ′:¬(S → t :S) has to be true. Since ¬(S → t :S) is evidenced by t ′, it remains to
show that ¬(S → t :S) is true, meaning that S has to be true, while t :S has to be false. The former is guaranteed by
deﬁnition of v; the latter means that either S has to be false (but we know otherwise) or S should not be evidenced by
t. To summarize, it is sufﬁcient to show that S /∈ ∗(t) for our evidence function ∗.
Let us deﬁne an auxiliary evidence function ∗′ to be the smallest CS-function. Obviously, ∗′(s) ⊆ ∗(s) for each term
s (because ∗ is also a CS-function).
Lemma 19. Let s be a subterm of t, then
(1) If F ∈ ∗′(s) then F is a theorem (of LPCS ) and F does not contain occurrences of t in it.
(2) If F ∈ ∗(s) \ ∗′(s), then F has at least one occurrence of t in it. Moreover, if F is an implication, then F = (S →
t :S) → ⊥, which is the formula evidenced by t ′ in ∗.
Corollary 20. t is not an evidence for S according to evidence function ∗.
Proof. Assume S ∈ ∗(t). S may or may not be evidenced by t in ∗′. In the former case, according to Lemma 19.1, S
has to be a theorem, which it is not; in the latter case, according to Lemma 19.2, S has to contain t, which it does not.
Contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 19. We prove both claims by induction on complexity of subterm s.
Case 1 (s is a proof constant c): (1) Only axioms are evidenced by proof constant c in ∗′; all axioms are theorems.
On the other hand, these axioms cannot contain occurrences of c because CS is not self-referential; c is a subterm of t,
so these axioms cannot contain t either.
(2) Nothing new is evidenced by c in ∗ compared to ∗′ unless t ′ = c; in this latter case ¬(S → t :S) ∈ ∗(c) \ ∗′(c),
but this formula contains t and is the implication (S → t :S) → ⊥. 10
Case 2 (s is a proof variable x): (1) Nothing is evidenced by proof variables in ∗′. So claim 1 is vacuously true.
(2) Nothing is evidenced by x in ∗ either, unless t ′ = x; in this latter case ¬(S → t :S) ∈ ∗(x) \ ∗′(x); this formula
satisﬁes all conditions of claim 2.
Case 3 (s =!s1): (3) According to rule 1a, F ∈ ∗′(!s1) for the smallest CS-function ∗′ only if F = s1:G, where
G ∈ ∗′(s1). By IH, G has to be a theorem that does not contain t. Since !s1 is a subterm of t, term s1 does not contain t
either, so s1:G does not contain t.
9 Evidence function ∗′ is said to be smaller than function ∗ if ∗′(s) ⊆ ∗(s) for each term s.
10 Negation ¬A is an abbreviation of A → ⊥.
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To show that s1:G is a theorem we will use completeness. Consider any CS-model M′. M′ G because LPCS G;
G is evidenced by s1 in M′ because s1 is an evidence for G for the smallest CS-function ∗′. Therefore, M′  s1:G.
s1:G is true in every CS-model, therefore LPCS  s1:G.
(2) If F ∈ ∗(!s1) \ ∗′(!s1), then either
(a) F = s1:G, where G ∈ ∗(s1) \ ∗′(s1) or
(b) t ′ =!s1 and F = ¬(S → t :S).
The latter case is trivial and similar to the already considered cases of s = x and s = c; in the former case, by IH
formula G has to contain t, thus so does s1:G. It remains to note that s1:G is not an implication.
Case 4 (s = s1 · s2): (1) According to rule 1b, F ∈ ∗′(s1 · s2) for the smallest CS-function ∗′ only if there exists G
such that (G → F) ∈ ∗′(s1) and G ∈ ∗′(s2). By IH, LPCS G → F and LPCS G, so by modus ponens LPCS F .
By IH, G → F does not contain t; hence neither does F.
(2) If F ∈ ∗(s1 · s2) \ ∗′(s1 · s2), then either
(a) (G → F) ∈ ∗(s1) \ ∗′(s1) and G ∈ ∗(s2) for some formula G, or
(b) (G → F) ∈ ∗(s1) and G ∈ ∗(s2) \ ∗′(s2) for some formula G, or
(c) t ′ = s1 · s2 and F = ¬(S → t :S).
In case a, by IH, implication G → F would have to be (S → t :S) → ⊥, so G = S → t :S. Being evidenced by s2
in ∗, S → t :S might or might not be evidenced by s2 in ∗′. In the former case, by IH, S → t :S would have to be a
theorem which it is not; in the latter case, being an implication, by IH, S → t :S would have to be (S → t :S) → ⊥
which it is not either. The contradiction shows that case a is impossible.
In case b, by IH,Gwouldhave to contain t, soG → F would contain t too, andhence, by IH, (G → F) ∈ ∗(s1)\∗′(s1),
impossibility of which was shown in case a. Hence case b is also impossible.
Case c is trivial.
Case 5 (s = s1 + s2): (1) According to rule 1c, F ∈ ∗′(s1 + s2) for the smallest CS-function ∗′ only if F ∈ ∗′(s1)
or F ∈ ∗′(s2). In either case, by IH, F has to be a theorem that does not contain t.
(2) If F ∈ ∗(s1 + s2) \ ∗′(s1 + s2), then
(a) F ∈ ∗(s1) \ ∗′(s1), or
(b) F ∈ ∗(s2) \ ∗′(s2), or
(c) t ′ = s1 + s2 and F = ¬(S → t :S).
In cases a–b, by IH, F has to contain t, plus the only implication of such type is (S → t :S) → ⊥.
Case c is trivial. 
We have shown that S is not evidenced by t, thus M  ¬t ′:¬(S → t :S). By completeness, LPCS ¬t ′:¬
(S → t :S). 
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